محمود منشی پوری

The COVID-19 pandemic has strengthened the hands of authoritarian regimes. Unlike those who have claimed that the outbreak tends to accelerate the movement toward greater geopolitical competition, we argue that the pandemic has necessitated further cooperation between democratic and authoritarian governments, thus enhancing the longevity of the latter. This explains why the global pandemic has caused no fundamental changes in the regional security dynamics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), in part because it has ironically prolonged the rule of authoritarian in the region in the name of providing public health. Despite the rhetoric of religious pluralism, moderation, as well as constitutional reforms, sentiments echoing narrow and virulent nationalism and right-wing populism have simultaneously prevailed. On balance, the persistent use of repression in liberalized autocracies in the region has manifested itself in the form of repressing protesters during tough economic times.  For example, in protests against unemployment in Oman in 2018 or against tax reform in Jordan in 2019, and during Saudi Arabia’s 2017-20 Qatif unrest or in Algeria’s ongoing political protests, such patterns of behavior have been visible.  Even in those regimes that have introduced constitutional reforms in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, when priority has been given to combating a global pandemic, a floundering economy, and other emerging threats, such as the campaign against terrorism, authoritarian regimes have wound up consolidating their rule, thus exploiting such crises in order to grab further power at home and seek geopolitical advantage in the region.  However, it is short-sighted to underestimate the possibility of the spontaneous eruption of popular uprisings that could pose a destabilizing threat to authoritarian regimes at some point in the future.

This paper draws attention to some of the consequences of the decline and possible slump of the liberal world order, while focusing predominantly on factors that have divided the Western world, most notably the toxic rise of nationalism, nativism, populism, authoritarianism, anti-institutionalism, anti-immigrant, and anti-globalization sentiments.  We argue, that as the United States further embraces economic nationalism and protectionism under the Trump administration, the support for multilateral institutions, rooted in the liberal order, is likely to significantly retreat.  The dissolution of the liberal order will arguably pave the way for political disorder across the globe, while at the same time dividing the Western world at a time when an economically resurgent China, in a strategic alliance with a more assertive Russia under Putin, is likely to pose new challenges to the West.  Their rivalries notwithstanding, both Beijing and Moscow are likely to seek ways to improve their bilateral relations with Washington in order to curtail and better manage regional and global tensions.   It is worth noting that the risks of abandoning a liberal world order, which for more than seven decades has espoused relative prosperity, as well as a legal and institutional framework for conflict resolution, may prove to be enormously damaging and consequential.

Social media has concurrently unified and fractured the Palestinian people. It has facilitated international condemnation of Israeli occupation but also has fueled violence and sectarian conflict.  Pro-Palestinian activists continue to pursue Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) efforts and work with Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) professionals to further develop an Internet-based presence and distribute information using social media and new platforms. If, however, the Palestinian resistance movement is to succeed, it must come to terms with the emancipatory and simultaneously contradictory effects of social media.

The complex and multi-faceted geopolitical environment created in Syria and the Middle East today makes it extremely difficult for the United States and its Western and regional allies to continue its policy of calling for the removal of the Assad regime. Arguably, Assad’s departure from power at this time would prove to be a critical mistake, with the scope of its ramifications largely unknown. In this essay, we will engage first in discussing the lack of a detailed and comprehensive day-after strategy by Western powers to be implemented in Syria, should Assad be removed, and how this could lead to a multitude of complicated problems. We will then analyze Syria’s role as a showground of strategic competition between many regional and world powers, and how Assad’s departure could result in a much more intensified rivalry between and among these powers. We conclude that there are many inevitable trade-offs involved in ending the Syrian civil war, but that for now the growing threat ISIS poses to the world renders defeating the Islamic State a higher priority over advocating a regime change in Syria.  Moving forward, the essay examines nonviolent alternatives to the military intervention/strike in Syria. 

The 2016 elections in Iran, both for parliament and the Assembly of Experts, offer essential insights into the possible future direction of the country's foreign policy. Even though the results of elections in Iran have not usually been as desired, Iranian people have always valued the opportunity of voting in order to express their political views. During the 2016 elections, they had the choice of voting for either a radical or a moderate response to the country's wide range of internal and external challenges. Ultimately, Iranians shifted their votes towards the moderate party, which also indicates their satisfaction of the nuclear deal. As a result, almost all of the representatives who opposed the nuclear deal lost their seats in parliament. President Rouhani now has the political capital to push a course of greater socioeconomic reform and liberalization at home and engagement abroad. With a blend of descriptive and analytic approaches, this paper intends to provide a review on Iran’s 2016 elections, as well as to analyze the possible obstacles that might exist in the path of the Rouhani administration for Iran’s future foreign policy.

This paper argues spiral arms race in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is spurious and highly unlikely to lead to further stability.  There is substantial evidence to suggest that the threat of arms race and the so-called “proliferation cascade” is a bogus excuse to thwart Iran’s nuclear deal with the “P5+1” group.  Our central argument is that the notion that arms race intensifies regional rivalries may seem reasonable on its face, but it fails to match reality. Arguably, an arms race does not currently exist between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The situation can be more accurately described as a one-sided arms buildup where Saudi Arabia has out-spent Iran by colossal amounts while Iran has worked to compete with Saudi Arabia without a corresponding increase in military spending. While it is possible in theory that improved efficiency in the procurement of arms could result in real military capability gains—often disguised by stable military expenditure—there isn’t ample evidence to support the idea that this is indeed the case.