A New Approach to the Theory of Seapower in the 21st Century (In Times of War and Peace)

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Abstract

The environment of seas has undergone geopolitical changes in recent decades, which has had a profound impact upon the nature of seapower. The aim of the current research is to expound on the new nature of seapower in the 21st century. It also takes an approach that is not limited to wartime and, given the postmodern era, encompasses peace and international rivalry, especially global trade. First, the concept of classic seapower is discussed in this paper and then using the meta-analysis method, the concept of seapower in the present century is discussed by adopting a new approach. Research findings indicate that the new nature of seapower is based on the military and non-military dimensions of seapower, the relative nature of seapower, the various roles of naval forces, the new naval threats, the diverse functions of the sea environment, the context of the international order, the strategic link between seapower and land power, air and space powers, and the humanitarian operations in the sea environment. In the early years of the 21st century, these considerations have persuaded states out of taking a purely national approach to seapower and sea policy-making, but to accept multilateral interactions and cooperation by taking a transnational approach.

Keywords: Seapower, Peace, War, New Geopolitics of the Seas.

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1. Introduction

Amongst natural environments, sea and oceanic environments have attracted the attention of strategists and researchers owing to their environmental characteristics, breadth and vastness. In 1900, the strategic world was completely two-dimensional geo-physically, i.e., it encompassed land and sea. By the end of the twentieth century, the strategic world is now fivedimensional, i.e., air, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum have been added to land and sea dimensions (Gray,1992:2). Seapower is the only dimension of the national power of states which gives its owner legal mobility and physical presence in all parts of the world (Allahverdizadeh, 2019:123). Understanding the geographical environment of the sea is important in understanding and adopting marine policy and strategy, i.e., the geographical location of the sea impacts on the foreign policy of states (Grygiel, 2006:9-11). Geographical considerations determine the states' views on the sea and their strategic approach (Till,2009:89; Gray,1990). Also, states' access to sea environments has an important place in the geopolitical position of states and is one of the important factors in their development (Allahverdizadeh and etal, 2017). The political nature of the sea is shaped by different dimensions such as seapower, maritime strategy, sea diplomacy, and maritime threats. The current study has put emphasis on the seapower of states.

The nature of sea power and its factors have been the subject of heated debate amongst researchers, the military, and strategists in the last century. Researchers' different view on seapower emanates from their different scientific and professional backgrounds. Seapower is a flexibility concept that is influenced by developments in the international order. In the present age, we are witnessing changes in the structure of the international order, the geopolitical environment of the seas, the legal framework of the seas, the formation of sea-based coalitions and the security environment of the seas. Furthermore, changes and developments in maritime technology, naval equipment (nuclear and non-nuclear), the expansion of multiple actors (governmental and non-governmental), changes in military and non-military tactics and strategies of maritime actors have caused maritime issues to be complicated. These dramatic changes encourage us to think about the political nature of the seas, especially seapower. The classic concept of seapower today does not suit the new requirements, and we need to give a

new nature to seapower; In other words, the sea environment has changed functionally and the concept of seapower needs to be reconsidered. The current study emphasizes on the theoretical nature and concept of seapower along with its new aspects.

2. The Research Method

The purpose of writing this article is to present a new theoretical approach to seapower in the 21st century, but not expound on the factors and elements of seapower. In this research study, the concept of seapower is examined and using the meta-analysis method, the concept of seapower is explained by adopting a new approach in the present century. Also, the various dimensions and aspects of seapower are discussed. This research is fundamental in terms of purpose and is descriptive-analytical in terms of nature and method. Data are collected using library resources. Also, data are analyzed using qualitative and inferential methods. Various examples have been used to explain the nature of states' seapower.

3.Seapower

The characteristics of the sea and oceanic environment have led to an opposing view of this environment. On the one hand, the seas are described with positive concepts such as fascinating immensity, unrestricted freedom, resource-rich space, and the courage and solidarity of sailors. One the other hand, sea environments are described with negative concepts such as unpredictability, the unknown, the inhospitable, the infinite, and the unregulated. The sea environment is considered a space devoid of freedom and at the same time an unregulated space that is prone to the proliferation of non-state actors. This representation has existed frequently since ancient times in the sea literature (Germond, 2015:26). However, with the international laws that have been enacted in the last century to establish legal order in the sea environment, the seas have become more orderly and predictable than in the past and they have a legal nature.

People have used the sea for commercial, transportation and travel purposes from time immemorial. The Mediterranean region is often referred to as the center of civilization and seapower (Bradford, 2016:1; Stevens and Westcott, 1920:15). The civilizations of Greece, Carthage, Phoenicia, and Egypt had made great strides in the Mediterranean. The intellectual achievements of ancient Greece are still the basis of any research into the concept of seapower as a strategy, culture, identity or empire, and Greece was the first great seapower (Lambert,2018:53). Maritime historians often refer to ancient Greece to find evidence of the military use of the sea, but this is certainly an old phenomenon. According to Egyptologists, the oldest known naval warfare dates back to the 12th century BC. But Egypt has been involved in some kind of naval warfare since around 3000-3500 BC. The economic importance of the sea (especially for fishing and coastal transport) has been realized since ancient time (Germond,2015:2-3).

The sea environment became strategically important when it became possible to build ships for navigation and fighting. In general, as soon as it became possible to use the sea for commercial and military purposes, seapower started to influence history; However, sea trade in general and aspects of naval warfare in particular were limited until the end of the Middle Ages¹ (Germond, 2015:2-3). From ancient times until the 16th century, the scope of action of seapowers was regional. With the beginning of the Renaissance and the great sea discoveries, seapowers operated and had a scope of action at a global scale. Since the 16th century, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States have each led the world for approximately one hundred years. The UK ruled the world for two centuries (18th and 19th centuries). These powers shared common characteristics such as insular or semi-insular location, industrial-commercial enterprise, capacity for coalition, and most importantly, organizing for global access through seapower (Modelski and Thompson, 1988:15-16). Throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, the United States, as the world's dominant seapower, has greater influence and a more diverse and complex function.

4.Research Findings

4-1. The Concept of Seapower in the 21st Century

Seapower is a part of the national power that arises from the characteristics of the sea and ocean environment. The nature of seapower and its factors

^{1.} Due to the dominance of the land environment in world geopolitics, the seas played a marginal role in the world power equations until the 16th century. In fact, from the 16th century onwards, the sea environment played a key role in the regional and global arenas, and powerful states in each period were able to use the sea environment to expand seapower in particular and global power in general. In other words, seapower (regionally and globally) was introduced only from the 16th century onwards. At the same time, the stability of seapower was greater than that of land power.

and elements have been examined in scientific and military circles for nearly a century. The nature of this dimension of the national power has undergone substantial changes due to the conditions of the international political order, technological progress and legal considerations. Traditional seapower placed more emphasis on military, communications, and transportation issues. It seems that we cannot emphasize the traditional nature of seapower since the geopolitical changes in the sea environment in recent decades force us to look for a new nature of seapower which is consistent with these geopolitical changes. Therefore, the nature of this power must be evaluated in the light of these changes and the conditions of the 21st century.

The items which should be considered in the new nature of seapower are as follows:

- Seapower has military and non-military dimensions (economic, security, political-diplomatic, environmental, legal, and so on);
- Seapower is relative in nature and we cannot compare states in absolute form:
- Within the seapower framework, naval power and its means, namely naval forces, play different military and non-military roles in times of war and peace;
- The nature of new threats in the coastal, sea and oceanic environment;
- The context of the international order:
- Multiple functions of the sea environment;
- Humanitarian operations in the sea environment;
- Strategic link between seapower and land, air and space powers.

4-2. Aspects of Seapower in the 21st Century

4-2-1. The Military and Non-Military Dimensions of Seapower

The concept of seapower has been discussed in various scientific and political domains such as strategic studies, history, diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations. The factors and elements of seapower of states have been discussed and criticized theoretically in the last century. In definitions of seapower and its models and structure, it is closely associated with naval power, naval forces, and maritime policy. The term seapower was introduced by Mahan (1898) as a strategic concept. Mahan coined the term seapower, but he did not express his strategic thoughts in a clear and concise manner. At that time, seapower meant the sum of naval power and transport capabilities (Sekine,2011:17). It seems that, in Mahan's view, seapower was a tool needed to destroy and repel organized military threats from other states. In his main work, Mahan emphasized that naval power was a key element in seapower and an important element of success in international politics. A nation that controlled the seas - the oceans and the coasts - could defend its commercial interests, and the economy was a decisive factor in the wars. Mahan's ideas stimulated the thinking of strategists and helped to justify naval expansion programs throughout the world, at least for the next half century (Stubbs and Truver,2011:4). However, Mahan's views on seapower did not only include military sea factors, but economic factors were at the basis of Mahan's thinking.

In Richmond's (1947) view, "seapower is a kind of national strength which enables its possessor to send his armies and commerce across the stretches of sea and ocean lying between his country or the countries of his allies, and at the same time, to prevent his enemy from doing the same" (ix). According to Richmond (1947), it is the duty of the statesman to preserve seapower in time of peace and to use it in time of war as a national weapon. Maintaining seapower in peacetime includes determining the national defense policy and the part in which the navy plays a role. Also, it includes deciding on the standard of the naval power compared to other forces, supply and maintenance of weapons with the necessary strength and efficiency, required bases for use, ships and sailors carrying armies (the navy) and trade (ix).

Gorshkov (1979: 1-6) considered the role of the naval forces to be very important in the nature of seapower, which prevents territorial threats and plays an important role in the state's economic development and wealth. Modelski and Thompson (1988:3-16) focused the concept of seapower on the naval power and the navy, and this is because of the influence that the naval forces exert on world politics and the world order. The long cycles of power in the world order from the 1500s to the present, which have lasted a hundred years, have been based on the supremacy of seapower. As Hill (1986:34–35) points out, classical writers such as Mahan, Corbett, Custance, Columbus or Castex were all interested in war and domination. Their focus has been on command of the sea and the importance of decisive battle. In their view, having naval power and its executive instruments, i.e., naval

forces, plays a central role in the state's seapower and command of the sea, and in most cases what they meant by seapower was naval power.

In some contemporary writings, the concept of seapower is limited to the naval forces (military aspect of the sea). To define seapower, Grove (1990: 3) uses a military concept and a form of military power stationed at sea (or from the sea) and discusses the military history at sea. However, he acknowledged that the relationship between the naval forces and other forms of sea use should be considered. From contemporary writers, Till (2009:20-23) explained the concept of seapower. In defining the concept of "seapower", he argues that the concept of "power" both as an input puts emphasis on characteristics that make a state and its people powerful (such as having military or economic strength) and as an output it is defined as the impact it has on the behavior and actions of other states and actors. The output of seapower is not merely sea-based or it is not merely about what it takes to use the sea, but the capacity to influence the behavior of others and actors in the sea, land and air. This influence is applied to the actors active in the maritime field, including states, companies, institutions, groups and individuals, in order to provide the desired result for the state with seapower. Angstrom and Widen (2015:130) in defining seapower, while acknowledging the various aspects of seapower, believe that "seapower means the political and military use of the naval forces in war and peace. Therefore, naval forces turn into a resource or capability used in war and peace for political and military purposes. Seapower may also represent a state or an institution similar to a state whose existence and political ambition is significantly influenced by sea". Therefore, in most the abovementioned research studies, different aspects of seapower have not been explained. The dominance of a realistic view of international relations led to such a perception of seapower. In the realistic view, seapower means a strong naval force, an efficient merchant fleet (although today the states with the most powerful naval forces are not the ones with the largest merchant fleets) and some fixed geographical factors that contribute to the power of states. According to this perspective, the importance of seapower is largely due to the things that the naval forces can do at sea or from the sea to contribute to the national and economic security of states. Seapower is to increase power, and the naval force is a tool which states have at their disposal to secure their national interests and pursue a policy of power (Germond, 2015:6-7).

A mere focus on naval power in the first decade of the 21st century is not enough in order to explain seapower. Naval power is simply the ability to use military means at sea. The naval force (or naval power and the navy) is an element or subset of the seapower, but it is not the same, just as homeland security is a subset of a state's overall national security situation (Stubbs and Truver, 2011:5). There is a growing understanding that traditional military maritime actions need to be recognized in order to provide a better image of a state's seapower. The number and quality of naval forces are important and should play a key role in analyzing the seapower of states. At the same time, a state's military capabilities to use the sea affect its political goals (Bull,1976:1-9). In the contemporary period, non-military assets and resources have become much more important in the states' seapower, and therefore should be considered in a comprehensive study of the states' ability to use the seapower to achieve the desired result. Non-military maritime assets include the states' merchant fleets, the fishing industry and fishing stocks, oil rigs and reserves, ports and infrastructures. Seapower in the general sense includes naval power and naval forces along with other assets and capabilities that directly affect a state's or an organization's ability to use the sea (military and non-military factors). This power includes battleships, merchant ships and fishing vessels, land-based aircrafts, artillery and missile power, space-based satellites, sea insurance facilities and various other factors that are not necessarily naval in origin and may be operated by the Navy or other parts of the Armed Forces (Speller,2005:1-2). Non-military seapower capabilities such as merchant shipping or a capacity for insurance have a decisive effect on the seapower of states. The UK would have lost two World Wars at sea without these non-military capabilities (Speller, 2019:6).

As Germond (2015:14) points out, what distinguishes seapower from the concept of mere naval power is the geographical and geopolitical nature of seapower which operates in the sea environment. What is meant by the geopolitical nature of seapower is the use of sea for achieving political goals and influencing the behavior of sea actors. Seapower refers to the states' performance on a global scale using the naval power, seapower is a tool or

means whose use can have global or national consequences (Modelski and Thompson, 1988:4). In the doctrine of some states, the use of seapower to achieve non-military and political objectives has been taken into account. In British Maritime Doctrine, seapower is defined as "the ability to project power at sea and from the sea to influence the behavior of people or the course of events" (British Ministry of Defense, 2017a). In other words, seapower is a broad concept which founded on a state's maritime tradition and dependency. Seapower includes a number of economic, political, military, and influence elements that are realized through a state's ability to use the sea (British Ministry of Defense, 2017b:3).

4-2-2. The "Relative" Nature of Seapower

Seapower is relative according to the specific situation, and even the specific conditions of states, and it is absolutely impossible to compare states with each other in terms of seapower and it depends on the context in which states operate. For example, Japan is stronger than the United States for waging a war in North Asia, it is weaker in the Caribbean (Till,1984: 13). In the 1976 war between Britain and Iceland over the exploitation of economic resources and fishing rights in the North Atlantic, the outcome of the war ultimately led to Britain's defeat and its failure to achieve its political goals although Britain underestimated Iceland's maritime capability. Britain in another situation in 1982, in the Falklands War, defeated Argentina. Although Britain did not have the desired military superiority, the result was Britain's decisive success in this war (Sanders, 2014:16). Therefore, how much seapower a state has will depend on what they are trying to achieve, when, where and against whom or what. Seapower is determined by the desired effect and the probability of achieving this effect. An effective assessment of each state's strength should include a review of other naval forces in the region, as well as their commitments and missions (Sanders, 2014:16; Till, 2009:118). With regard to the change in military and non-military tactics and strategies and the advancements in technology in the twentieth century, states are present in surface, above, and under the sea with a variety of naval equipment, and as in the past, absolute sea command is not possible. In other words, maritime technology has become common among political actors (governmental and non-governmental) in the maritime arena, and at present there is usually talk of a limited maritime presence in space and time, i.e., a realistic control that refers to limited space and time in the sea (Cable,1985:37). The real issue is the degree of seapower. Almost all states have some degree of seapower, which might be through their naval power, shipbuilding, their maritime insurance skills and their capacity to provide mariners, or a combination of all of these characteristics. However, some states are more or less superior to other states, and this relationship is strategically significant in peace and war times (Till,2009:22).

4-2-3. Different Roles of Naval Forces in Seapower of States

One aspect of seapower is the power of naval forces. Naval forces refer to the armed platforms and forces that are active at sea (ships, marine infantry, and so on), below the sea (submarines, and so on) and in above the sea and the shoreline (naval aviation) (Angstrom and Widen,2015:130). There is a general relationship between naval force rankings and a state's status in the international order. The idea that the international order is hierarchical is widely accepted, and naval force rankings reinforce this belief (Germond, 2014:44). There is compelling evidence that navies enhance global presence and power (Gartzke and Lindsay,2020).

Booth (1977:15) makes the most complete statement of naval force duties. He based his approach on the three uses of the sea: 1. For the transportation of goods and people; 2. For the transportation of military force for diplomatic purposes, or for the use of military force against targets on land and at sea; and 3. The exploitation of sea resources. Booth proposed a model of sea functions that was reused and modified by Grove (1990) and Speller (2019). According to Booth (1977:15-25), the navy force has three important tasks or roles: military role, diplomatic role and constabulary role (protection or law enforcement). Booth (1977) stressed that what gives meaning to a navy's other modes of action is its ability to threaten and use force. In the constabulary role, the navy can expand its sovereignty (mostly in sea zones) as well as defend naval resources. The navy in its diplomatic role provides a force that changes the political calculations of other states and also enhances the credibility of states (Booth, 1977:15-25; Hattendorf, 1989:141). These naval roles have been considered by the British Ministry of Defense and the Australian Navy in the British Maritime Doctrine (2017) and the Australian Maritime Doctrine (2010). Britain has specified three roles for its maritime doctrine, namely war fighting, maritime security, and defense engagement (British Ministry of Defense, 2017b: 50-53). The Australian Navy has three militaries, defense and diplomatic roles for the Navy. The three roles for the Australian Navy are explained in more detail; For example, the naval military role is divided into two parts, the naval role at sea and the naval role from the sea (Royal Australian Navy, 2010:99-100). This model draws theoretical boundaries between the three levels of severity of naval use of power, namely policing operations in accordance with national and international law, the threat of use of force, or the very limited use of force, sometimes in violation of international legal norms (navy force diplomacy) and war operations (up to high-intensity warfare). The model also distinguishes between three main naval objectives (or ultimate causes), namely monopolizing the proper and legitimate use of violence at sea (policing function), preventing the use of force in the future, reducing crises, deterring rivals and reassuring allies (diplomatic functions), and winning wars or military intervention in the internal affairs of other states (military functions) (Germond, 2015: 40-41).

From Grove's point of view, given the changes in naval warfare and the operational environment facing the navy and naval powers, sea environments today have three roles, namely diplomatic, defense, and military. In other words, military seapower has three military, diplomatic, and defense functions or missions. The military uses of seas include power projection, sea control, and sea denial. The diplomatic use of seas includes showing the flag and various forms of Gunboat Diplomacy. The defense uses of the sea include maintaining proper sovereignty and order, protecting national resources, and maintaining peace (Grove, 1990: 229-234). (Figure 1). Grove's model of the role of seas in the current era is incomplete and economic issues, the environment and international organized crimes need to be further discussed in this model.

^{1.} Gunboat Diplomacy itself includes four different forms, namely definitive, purposeful, catalytic, and expressive.




Figure (1): Triangle of the use of the Seas

(Source: Grove, 1990: 234)

The end of the Cold War did not merely bring about geopolitical changes and a change in the bipolar structure of the world, but rather the nature of the threats and military conflict changed. The role of the army has changed in the new era, and according to Till (1994), the war is not about generals and statesmen who waged wars for specific political purposes based on the Clausewitz war principles, and we face new threats such as terrorism. A flexible naval force is needed to counter new threats, to establish maritime security and proper order at sea. A flexible naval force (variety of functions) is usually more efficient than a specialized one and can perform a range of naval activities, namely military, policing, and diplomatic. According to Sanders (2014:24-26), a "balanced navies" (flexible navies) have broad capabilities in peace and war, and are often more effective. It is generally believed that balanced navies provide states with flexible, agile and adaptable forces compared to specialized navies.

4-2-4. The Nature of New Threats in the 21st Century

Sea environments are more at risk of terrorism, piracy (sea and coastal) and smuggling (humans and drugs). In other words, the free environment of coasts and seaports has made these areas prone to human threats. Piracy, which dates back to 1200 BC, is still a costly scourge for the commercial

maritime industry and involves the use of various tactics and platforms that pose a challenge to ships and ports (McNicholas, 2008:161). The first acts of piracy can be traced back to 3000 years ago. The first piracy was carried out by a group called the "Sea Peoples". These naval invaders lived around 1200 BC, trying to enter Egypt by navigating the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and creating political unrest. Piracy is currently concentrated in two regions of the world, namely Southeast Asia and Africa. Most illicit drugs (and narcotics) smuggled from the place of cultivation and production to international markets are transported by sea, containers and vessels. This criminal activity poses a significant challenge to seaports and merchant vessels. The increase in opium and cocaine production over the past few years has similarly increased the amount of illicit drugs available for transportation. The growing production and demand of illicit drugs especially heroin, cocaine and marijuana - ensures that merchant vessels, their cargoes and seaports continue to be targeted by drug traffickers. In addition, ship crews and port security forces continue to be challenged with innovative and diverse methods and techniques of smuggling (McNicholas, 2016:169-170,207,258). Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, the US government and the global maritime community were increasingly concerned about the possibility of the transfer of weapons, explosives and individuals through commercial transport (vessels, aircraft, railways, trucks). Targeting and attacking ships and ports by terrorist organizations has increased significantly in the last 10 years. In addition, small vessels are used as the main platform for launching or carrying out attacks. An increasing concern is that terrorists want to gain control of maritime transport in order to use them as a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction (McNicholas, 2008:225).

In the 21st century, maritime security operations are quite different from the definitions of the Cold War period. In the new era, we are not just dealing with classic state actors and official political units at sea. Requiring states to carry out maritime security operations reflects the emergence of diverse, unpredictable, asymmetric and transnational challenges such as drug, arms and human trafficking by organized crime groups, the proliferation of chemical, biological and radiological weapons with collective effects, piracy, excessive use of economic rights at sea, disruption of maritime trade, the scope of political and religious extremism at sea, global health threats,

mass migration, marine habitat destruction, over-exploitation from fisheries, and marine pollution (Stubbs and Truver,2011:6). It is not possible to counter these threats with traditional military forces.

4-2-5. The Context of the International Order

Contextual factors at the national and international levels have a significant impact upon the seapower of states. Sources of power are manifold, and power and capability are not always the same thing. A state might possess a large navy, but if there is no tendency domestically for realizing this capability, then the exercised power will be diminished. In other words, this capability and potential will not lead to seapower. In contrast, a small navy can wield considerable power in many contexts; For example, if potential adversaries are risk averse (Sanders, 2014:16-17). In the study of states' seapower, since the level of analysis is done on a national scale, all the factors and elements of seapower are usually assessed at the national level. Transnational variables have a significant impact upon the seapower of states. Apart from the nature of the new threats, other transnational variables such as the conditions of the global political order, international alliances, global economic crises, globalization, and international crises affect states' seapower. For these transnational variables, many examples can be mentioned that are somehow related to the states' seapower.

During the Cold War and the bipolar order, the maritime presence of states was influenced by the bipolar equations or the East-West relations of that period. The most important sea threat in this period arose from the rivalry of the states and the limited wars of the satellite states, the direct or proxy presence of the United States and the Soviet Union. The navies of some of the affiliates of each of the political poles or non-aligned states depended on technology and technical support from the Soviet Union or the United States. Indonesia acquired a naval fleet with the help of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indonesia lost its technical support and its navy was severely damaged (Kearsley, 1990:166-167). This condition was experienced in a different way for Iran in the second Pahlavi era, and Iran, with the help of the West, especially the United States, had a limited navy in the 1960s and 1970s (1340s and 1350s HA). In fact, in order to maintain the balance (or hegemony) of power in the Persian Gulf region during the Cold War, Iran had adequate military forces and equipment (Assadi, 2002: 343-347).

The impact of the International Coalition renders the use of force unnecessary. In other words, cooperation and sea alliances do not always have a strict and military approach, but the type of movements and relations between states have political implications. In the Black Sea, for example, Georgia and Ukraine's cooperation with other trans-regional actors, such as the United States, through activities such as naval exercises or periodic exchange visits may send strong signals to other littoral states, which might impact on their calculations. (Sanders, 2014:16-17). Areas affected by the competition of regional or global powers, the role and function of the navies depends on the type of relationship they have with those powers. The sea action of the Black Sea littoral states depends on the type of relationship with Russia and Western powers, especially the United States. International economic crises affect the capacity of states to invest in the maritime field. For instance, the global economic crisis of 2008 had a devastating effect on defense spending and, in general, investment in maritime assets and capabilities in many littoral states, especially the Black Sea littoral states (Sanders, 2014:34). The economic recession which occurred periodically in the last century between the shipbuilding states led to the bankruptcy of this industry in most states, including Finland, which had a leading shipbuilding industry. With the recession, less competitive centers were marginalized, and the focus of shipbuilding shifted to a few states (Kearsley, 1990:176-177). This condition occurred in the commercial shipbuilding industry. However, we can see the competition of states and spending a lot of money to build a military fleet. A few states can build battleships since it is complex, it requires high technology and it needs the required level of skills. The relationship between globalization and seapower has been considered important. According to Tangredi (2002), there is a mutual relationship between globalization and seapower. There is a strange relationship among the inherent elements of the concept of seapower popularized by Mahan, i.e., between the acceleration of international communications and trade, the multinational use of the sea as a "common global" resource, the reduction of national security with the well-known components of globalization. Sea environment and seapower are among the geo-economic goals of states, and seapower is a means of access to the global economy, and seapower plays an important role in globalization. Globalization depends entirely on the free flow of trade, which is mainly done through sea. For this reason, seapower is at the center of the globalization process in a way that land and air power are not (Till,2007:30). Globalization in the economic and communication spheres has affected seapower, which is the catalyst for globalization. Sea and oceanic environments are the important geographical context for globalization. 90% of world trade is done through sea environments (IMO, 2012:7). The amount of sea transport has increased from 2.60 billion tons of goods loaded in 1970 to 11.7 billion tons in 2019 (UNCTAD,2020:4). The flexibility and freedom of transportation of goods and materials in the sea environment, along with the low cost of sea transport, has encouraged states to use this geographical area for communication and trade. In fact, since sea environments are vital to the global economy, states have been encouraged to expand the military and economic dimensions of their seapower. The important motivation of some states, such as China, in the development of seapower, is to support the merchant fleets and ensure trade security in sea environments and sea passages.

According to Till (2009: 1-19), globalization is a key determinant of the form and nature of states' global policies. Governmental attitudes toward globalization, in turn, will be a key determinant of maritime strategy, defense, and, consequently, the size, shape, composition, and performance of the navies. According to Till (2009), different perspectives on the impact of globalization upon states produce two possible types of navies with slightly different missions or functions, namely modern navies and postmodern navies. In order to address the diverse range of threats and opportunities posed by globalization, postmodern navies are developing forces and strategies that can perform four functions, namely sea control, expeditionary operations, good order at sea, and the maintenance of a maritime consensus. Modern navies, whose states are likely to be cautious about the effects of globalization, are less involved in participatory sea affairs such as good order at sea and the maintenance of a maritime consensus, but they focus more on nuclear deterrence, ballistic missile defense, sea control and they adopt a more limited concept of power projection. Gray has recognized the importance of the international order in shaping seapower. Gray (1994:168-182) does not endorse the idea of replacing geopolitics with geo-economics, and challenges the idea that globalization is a dominant feature of the international order. From Gray's (1994) point of view, the international order, and consequently the maritime

order, is formed by the enduring dynamics of power rivalries and conflicts. Also, Gray (1994) reaches similar pessimistic conclusions on the impact of the international order upon seapower. He argues that the future international order will witness an increase in regional chaos, including the proliferation of high-tech weapons as well as the wider distribution of weapons of mass destruction, which impacts upon the ability of states, and even the most powerful of them, in using seapower to achieve their political goals. In spite of Gray's (1994) pessimism, common threats and opportunities in the sea environment have brought states together. States need to come up with a single executive mechanism on most issues. Sea threats from some states or terrorist groups have endangered the economic interests, the flow and transit of goods, and even pose a territorial threat to states due to the relative freedom of their littoral environments and sea zones.

4-2-6. Sea Environment with Multipurpose Function

The sea and oceanic environment in the distant past had mostly military and economic functions and the economic function of the sea related to the transportation of goods, trade exchanges or limited use of fishery resources. In modern times, the economic, communication, legal, military and security functions of states at sea have become more complex and diverse. The economic function of the sea is not limited to transportation and fisheries. Exploitation of fossil and non-fossil sea resources (sea mineral resources), extensive extraction of fishery resources, use of hydropower in the form of wave and tidal energy, littoral-sea tourism approach, aquaculture, and so on, have made the sea an important part of the economies of the states. The seas have taken on the role of public livelihood sources more than before due to the increase in population and the limitation of land environments in meeting the food needs of the people. The communication role of the sea has become increasingly important with greater complexity compared to the past. The communication role of the sea is in the field of transportation as well as digital messaging and telecommunications.

The legal dimension of sea environments has significantly developed in recent decades. The claim of littoral states to sovereignty and dominance over sea zones is in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982) and subsequent conventions. The exercise of sea jurisdiction in maritime zones and disputes on this subject have been the source of political and territorial tensions between states, and a large part of the boundary disputes between states are related to sea boundaries. With the separation of maritime zones and delimitation of aquatic environments, the sea jurisdiction of littoral states has been recognized and the freedom of sea action of third states has been restricted and the high seas in the oceans has become a shared body of water in which states' behavior must be based on international law, and the need for their collective use by and belonging to human beings is emphasized by sea conventions (United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS,1982). But overall, the freedom of states in the sea environment is high compared to land, and international maritime law is still growing. Therefore, there is little control over the behavior of states and other actors at sea. In addition to the legal dimension of the seas, we should mention the wide, dynamic and flexible area of the seas which create complex conditions.

4-2-7. Humanitarian Operations in the Sea Environment

Seapower includes the ability and capacity to perform non-military maritime tasks such as protecting sea resources, ensuring the safe transit and passage of cargoes and people at sea, protecting sea borders, protecting sea sovereignty, rescuing people in danger and preventing the misuse of oceans (Sanders, 2014:17). Humanitarian operations are an important part of the maritime non-military tasks, which play a crucial role in the maritime strategy of some seapowers such as the United States in times of war and peace (A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower, 2015). The naval coalitions of states and seapowers are not only limited to military and diplomatic affairs. However, meeting human and natural hazards and threats at sea is an important part of naval coalition operations. For instance, the US Navy's Pacific Fleet in 2005 expanded the Pacific Partnership to execute a variety of "Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA)" activities throughout the "Pacific Fleet area of responsibility" (Hszieh and et.al,2014:16). Humanitarian operations include a wide range of naval operations, such as Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, securing shipping lanes and beaches, and meeting human and natural hazards. Humanitarian operations in the sea environment are particularly complex. The fluid environment of the sea, along with the rights of littoral states in sea zones has impacted on the way humanitarian operations are carried out. The rights and obligations of the littoral states are not the same in the maritime regions according to the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), and from the Territorial Sea to the exclusive-economic zone and the high seas, the rights of the littoral states are limited. In the Territorial Sea, the rights of third states are limited and limited to the right of innocent passage. Therefore, carrying out humanitarian operations in this sea zone has a special delicacy. Given the legal and political requirements of the seas, in naval operations, balancing power, legitimacy and authority is always a delicate task. This is especially true of multinational naval operations under the auspices of the United Nations. In no sea zone is this more significant than the Territorial Sea (McLaughlin, 2009). In contrast, in open seas such legal restrictions are very low. It seems that the rights and tasks of states and seapowers need more coordination and development to establish peace at sea and to carry out humanitarian operations.

4-2-8. Strategic Link Between Seapower and Land, Air and Space Powers

Seapower uses the sea to achieve political or military goals. However, no seapower can achieve its goals without a connection to the land. There are reasons for this. Seapower cannot last forever at sea without a connection to land. Meeting the needs of navies obliges states to depend on the land environment. Meeting food, fuel, repair and re-launch needs of weapons and naval fleets, as well as human biological and physiological needs for land contact, are what require seapower to be connected with land. In fact, all sources of seapower come from land. It is not a misguided statement to say that seapower is a continuation of the land power of states. However, these two powers complement each other.

A state's seapower is part of its maritime and military strategy. In fact, seapower is the way in which states achieve their political or military goals. Here, reference to Corbett's (1911) theory of maritime strategy helps to better understand the issue. Corbett (1911) emphasized that the main goal of the maritime strategy is to dominate the sea and influence the land. "Because ultimately, conflicts and clashes are resolved on land" (Germond, 2015:46-47). According to Corbett (1911:15-16), "Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, vital issues between nations at war have always been decided in land and by army; the army can do against the enemy's territory and national life or by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for the army to do". From Corbett's point of view, therefore, the ultimate victory in war is on land and by the army; The strategic importance of the sea can only be understood through its relationship to land. In other words, naval operations are always carried out by taking into account their effects on the military, political or economic situation on land, either the protection of fisheries, counter-piracy, coastal defense, sea bombardment, commerce raiding or even sea battles between two high-sea fleets (Germond, 2015:34). Richmond and Barnett argued that in World War II, seapower did not win in sea war, but with the help of land power, and even air power, won the war. Gray (1999:218-219), on the other hand, argued that "seapower in all its forms, military and non-military, in World Wars and I and II, for NATO, in defending Japan and other East Asian allies from 1949 to 1989 played important strategic roles. From 1940 to 1944, for the war in Europe and necessarily for the whole of the Pacific War (against Japan), the Western Allies, under geostrategic conditions, were obliged to adopt a maritime strategy in the most precise sense conveyed by Corbett, maritime strategy in which the sea played a decisive and fundamental role in the principles of war". Given the political, technological, and geopolitical developments in the 20th century and the events that have occurred in this century, Gary (2001:25,31-32) argues that seapower offers the inherent advantages of adaptability, flexibility, and mobility in sea environments. However, seapower is considered an enabler in grand strategies and cannot independently be a factor in winning a war or having a sufficient strategic impact to end a war. According to Gray, it is a limitation of seapower that it cannot directly come to grips with a great continental power with a realistic (decisive and final) prospect of success.

5.Analysis

According to the research findings, the following analyses can be presented: Seapower has different aspects and naval power falls under sea power. Traditional and classical sea scholars focused mainly on the technical, tactical, operational, and strategic aspects of maritime warfare, and their understanding of seapower was more concerned with the military dimension of the sea. Thus, in classical writings, the concept of seapower was limited to the naval power (power of the navies). Today, seapower has been freed from the mere concept of a military that dates back to the pre-Cold War and world wars. Seapower is a comprehensive concept that encompasses all aspects of the use of the sea and hard and soft seapower. Seapower includes

military, economic, defense-security, and political dimensions. Seapower is made up of different military and non-military aspects, and the mere existence of naval power or navies does not imply complete seapower for a state. Gaining seapower requires a variety of tools, both military and nonmilitary. At the same time, possessing seapower means a state's entry into the leadership in the regional and global arena. In the hierarchy of regional and global power, possessing seapower is of a geopolitical and geostrategic nature. It is claimed that the relative nature of seapower dates back to modern times, in which the states' maritime balance was compared with each other at different times and places. Seapower in the postmodern period is a collective effort with a common advantage. Cooperation between states in maritime governance and maritime security is an important part of the post-modern seapower and the navy. Hence, instead of states competing with each other in the modern era, we need to have a collective, nongovernmental, and absolute approach to the navy and even seapower in the postmodern era, i.e., in the postmodern era, a liberal and non-governmental approach prevails that leads to stability, security and order at sea (Germond, 2020:26-35) and requires the collective cooperation of all states. At present, however, the navy and the collective seapower and the liberal and ideal view of seapower are assumed to be located on the margins of political decisions, given the competition in the world political order and the influence of realism on the behavior of states. States need to strengthen their collective approach due to their mutual dependence in the sea environment. The navy is the states' instrument of saber-rattling, i.e., the states' executive instrument of the seapower. In the last century, the use of the navy was more in the military and support of the merchant fleet. Recent changes in the geopolitics of the seas have persuaded states to use the navy for different military, political, economic and diplomatic purposes. In the recent century, the navy can perform a range of policing and diplomatic tasks in peacetime, including maintaining order at sea, maintaining maritime security, naval diplomacy, protecting marine resources, ensuring the safe transportation of goods and people at sea, protecting sea boundaries and zones, protecting maritime sovereignty, saving endangered individuals, and preventing ocean abuse. Prior to the Cold War, due to the dominance of the military approach in the sea environment, the navy was mainly large-scale and of the bluewater navy type. The tendency of states in recent decades to have a small navy alongside a large navy shows the determination of states to have a small navy with high flexibility and to take on multiple roles to adapt to new conditions. Military, constabulary and diplomatic roles have been important naval roles in recent decades. A small military fleet is better prepared to deal with new threats. New types of terrorist threats, piracy, the use of modern weapons by militant groups, and asymmetric battles at sea have persuaded states to have a small, flexible, highly mobile military fleet to counter new threats and use it in times of peace in line with peacetime maritime policies. Sea environments, compared to land environments, have low legal and practical control and do not have the solidity of land environments in terms of security. The flow of transport in sea environments faces many security threats, and the scope of these threats has increased in the post-Cold War period. The nature of maritime threats and how to deal with them are different from the Cold War period. Maritime threats in the new age are multidimensional. The natural and human nature of maritime threats has necessitated the compilation of a list according to geographical areas. The nature of the new threats is not state-centered, as it was during the Cold War, and we are not simply confronted with a hostile and rival state, but rather there is a variety of actors threatening security, from governments to criminal organizations and military and paramilitary groups at sea. Dealing with maritime security threats is not just state-centered, but rather the need for maritime alliances and cooperation must be given more and more attention by states. At the same time, limiting naval threats by military means alone is not possible. Appropriate legal and legislative measures in the sea environment, diplomatic and deterrent measures, the formation of international maritime coalitions, scientific cooperation and even the provision of financial assistance to less developed littoral states (such as Somalia), in addition to policing and even military action, must be considered by the states concerned.

International considerations play an important role in a state's maritime capabilities. Participation of states in international alliances and the support of friendly states in the form of financial, technological or political and diplomatic support, the structure of the international order and competitions based on national interests, the global integrated economy, security needs, as well as individual and collective defense have affected maritime movements and the actions of stakeholders at sea.

Seapower should have a broad and in-depth look at various maritime functions. Sea and ocean security environment has become much more complex owing to the relatively free environment of the seas, the role of the seas in the production of wealth and economic development of states, the growing food needs of the people to the sea, the multiplicity of maritime actors and the flexibility of this geographical environment. Recognizing the competition of states for dominance and sovereignty over the territorial, economic and marine resources, we are not only witnessing political and military tensions between them, but also the advantage of the seas is being destroyed and we are witnessing the destruction of animal and plant habitats. Also, military maritime activities are also limited by maritime territorializations, treaties and international conventions. However, military maneuvers, naval exercises, and military weapons testing take place in exclusive economic zone and the high seas, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, since it is related to peacetimes, has not considered very restrictive laws on military activity in many military activities and their implementation conditions are unclear, and one of the tensions between states is related to military activities at sea and the nature of these activities. Therefore, the military function of the sea must be considered in states' definition of seapower along with the economic, territorial (maritime territorialization), security and communication functions. For example, territorial and maritime security functions have the operational arena of major seapowers. In fact, territorialization of littoral and maritime states and the nature of new threats have limited the maritime ability of states to carry out large-scale and free actions. It has even affected the type of navy forces they have.

Seapower is not just about exercising power in the sea environment, but rather it involves the use of the sea environment to influence land and even air (and space) evolutions. Seapower is related to land and air power (and space power). A state's strategy determines what role the seapower plays in the military and political events and in relation to land, air, and space powers. The strategic effectiveness of seapower depends on the strengths and weaknesses of the actors against whom it is exercised, which is due to the relative nature of seapower. In the 20th century, seapower sometimes played a decisive role in war (such as the battle of Oceania against Japan), and in some cases, victory in war was made possible by land and air powers

(as in World Wars I and II) (Till,2009:22). Therefore, seapower must be in the form of a "strategic link" with other land, air and space powers. This strategic link is based on the military and technological relations of these powers with each other, as well as the strategic needs of the states, which is manifested in the form of maritime strategy and military strategy. It must be acknowledged, however, that most states in most eras have had an identifiably continental or maritime inclination in their strategic orientation and culture due to reasons basically of physical and political geography. Sea and land powers are rarely just sea or land powers, but their geopolitical identity is not often in doubt (Gray,1992:2).

6. Conclusions

The concept of seapower in the last two decades of the 21st century has been fundamentally different from the previous century. This difference is due to changes in the international order, geopolitical evolutions in the sea environment, changes in strategic considerations and national policies of states. Hence, the mere emphasis on the military and economic dimensions (especially transportation) of seapower is inconsistent with the requirements of the present time. With regard to these changes, the present study tried to expound on the nature of seapower theoretically. The new nature of seapower should be based on its military and non-military dimensions, the various roles of naval forces, the nature of new threats, the diverse functions of the sea environment, the context of the international order, the strategic link between seapower and land power, air and space powers, the relative nature of seapower, and the humanitarian operations in the sea environment. The aspects given to explain seapower are worth thinking about. "The power and ability of states to use the geographical environment of the sea and ocean in cooperation with other states based on national strategy and to achieve national and transnational interests," is the definition of the nature of seapower provided in the current study. This definition is based on the aspects of seapower, which are in line with the new conditions of the world system and the geopolitical developments in the sea-oceanic environment. If we wish to conclude from what has been said, we must say that seapower is free from the purely national approach that is the dominant approach of the 20th century. In the new century, states, and even the most powerful maritime states, cannot govern the sea environment solely through a national approach. States must interact to cooperate in a changing sea environment, i.e., they must have a transnational approach to maritime policy. There are many reasons why this transnational approach is necessary or justified. The expansion of new threats and environmental problems in the sea environment, the need for states to engage in economic activities and secure communications by sea, the change of sea environment from a turbulent and violent environment to an environment with diverse functions, dominance of states over the sea environment (maritime territorialization) according to international law, the increase in piracy and all kinds of international criminal gangs, the use of new weapons at sea by various actors, the multiplicity of governmental and non-governmental actors at sea, the multiplicity of seapower resources and in general changes in the geopolitical environment of the seas are reasons that have persuaded states to have a transnational view of the seas alongside a national approach, which is quite evident in the last two decades. States' cooperation for countering various maritime threats, holding joint multilateral exercises, formation of international coalitions at sea, formation of geopolitical seabased structures, states' cooperation based on the environmental considerations of the seas, different roles of the naval forces in peacetime, especially escorting the merchant fleets and participating in maritime diplomacy, making new sea laws and amending previous laws and conventions based on new requirements, and the participation of states in maritime research is a list of transnational and multilateral actions in states' policy which results in an increase in the international security and peace and economic development of all states. Of course, it can be said that this view is completely idealistic and based on good faith in international relations. We must note that this is the path that states have to take. States might not have the impetus for taking this path, but it is a definite path for the logical and rational exploitation of the seas. The present study does not reject the realistic approach in international relations, but rather, in addition to conventional rivalries, states should not neglect multilateral cooperation and interaction. Changes in the world political order and the maritime arena have necessitated maritime cooperation for states. States that depend on the sea environment or have a sea-based economy must be at the forefront of adapting to the new changes. Future seapowers are expected to be in the form of a power bloc or coalition of allied states.

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