براهین اثبات وجود ماده اولی نزد ابن سینا؛ یک بررسی انتقادی (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
ابن سینا، دو برهان «فصل و وصل» و «قوه و فعل» را بر اثبات وجود ماده اولی اقامه کرده است، در این مقاله نشان دادیم، بر هر دو برهان اشکالاتی وارد است. ادعای برهان فصل و وصل آن است که تغییر فصل و وصل ممکن نیست، مگر اینکه مؤلفه هیولا که حامل فصل و وصل است، موجود باشد، این مؤلفه، جزء مشترک و تأمین کننده عامل اینهمانی در طول دگرگونی و تغییر است، در این مقاله در طی استدلالی نشان دادیم، این برهان از عهده ادعایش یعنی اثبات وجود هیولا و نیز حل مسئله تغییر فصل و وصل بر نمی آید. دیگر برهان اثبات ماده اولی، برهان قوه و فعل است، در این مقاله نشان دادیم، بر اساس برهان قوه و فعل نیز امکان اثبات ماده اولی مشائین وجود ندارد. ادعای برهان آن است که از اثبات ویژگی بالقوه بودن، به اثبات وجود جوهر ماده اولی می رسد، این اثبات خود گامی است در جهت رسیدن به نظریه مختار ابن سینا در باب حقیقت اشیاء مادی که «ماده- صورت گرایی» نامیده می شود، اما؛ الف) اتصاف ویژگی بالقوگی را می توان در چارچوب نظریه رقیب ماده–صورت گرایی، یعنی نظریه «بسته ای» نیز تبیین کرد، بدون اینکه به سراغ ماده–صورت گرایی رفت، هرچند، برهان قوه و فعل، حتی در چارچوب این نظریه نیز دچار مشکل است. همچنین نشان دادیم، برهان قوه و فعل، حتی در چارچوب دیگر نظریه رقیب یعنی نظریه «زیرنهاد» نیز کارآمد نخواهد بود. حاصل آنکه نشان دادیم، هر دو برهان نمی توانند ماده اولی مد نظر ابن سینا را اثبات کنند.Arguments for the Prima Matter According to Ibn Sina: A Critical Review
Ibn Sina has put forward two arguments of "continuity and disconnection" and "potentiality and actuality" to prove the prime matter. Based on the arguments of continuity and disconnection, a change is not possible unless there is the prime matter, , a common and constant component providing identity during variation and change. In this article, we argue that this argument does not support its claim to prove the prime matter, nor can it solve the continuity and disconnection. Another argument of the prime matter is called the potentiality and actuality. in this article, we have shown that, based on the argument of potentiality and actuality, it is not possible to prove the prime matter. It is concluded that the two main arguments of the prime matter cannot prove the prime matter of Ibn Sina.
Keywords: Ibn Sina, Prime matter, Arguments, Continuity and Disconnection, Potentiality and Actuality
Introduction
"Hylomorphism" is a theory in which the structure of material objects is explained based on matter and form. Traditional Hylomorphism has a significant background. The center of Aristotle's metaphysics is the distinction between matter and form. Although this theory started with Aristotle and continued in the metaphysics of some different philosophers, some aspects of it is still needed to be analyzed.
Ibn Sina is one of the proponents of Hylomorphism theory. In his opinion, the central idea of Hylomorphism is that, material objects are composed of the substances of matter and the form.
The focus of this article is the analysis of two arguments to prove the Prime matter according to Ibn Sina. This analysis is based on the opinions of some analytical philosophers. The subject of the this article is to find out whether Ibn Sina has been able to adduce satisfactory arguments for proving the Prime matter?
Methodology
In this article, the research method is descriptive-analytical based on analytical and logical investigation. In this way, first, we collected information by studying different books and then analyzed the information by using logical analysis methods.
Finding
Ibn Sina has presented two arguments to prove the Prime matter: "Continuity and Disconnection” and "Potentiality and Actuality”.
Examining the argument of Potentiality and Actuality shows that in every material object there are two characteristics of Potentiality and Actuality, and these two characteristics are separate from each other, but it is not enough to prove the Prime matter and as a result, it is not possible to present Hylomorphism interpretation about the structure of material objects.
Also, based on an argument, we showed that the Continuity and Disconnection argument cannot prove the prime matter. Basically, the Prime matter is supposed to maintain the identity between objects during change. But we have shown that the monster cannot be a suitable answer to the problem of identity during change Because according to the Continuity and Disconnection argument, the Prime matter was not proved; we thus showed that the Prime matter cannot be a suitable answer to the problem of identity during change. To solve the problem of Continuity and Disconnection, we provided two solutions; the first solution is based on a three-dimensional analysis and the second solution, which does not require the assumption of the Prime matter, is based on a four-dimensional analysis.
In short, in this article, we have shown that there are problems with both arguments to prove the Prime matter. In other words, two arguments cannot prove the Prime matter.
Conclusion and discussion
The claim of the proof of Continuity and Disconnection is that it is not possible to change the Continuity and Disconnection unless there is the prime matter. This component is a constant component during change and provides identity during change.
we showed that, this argument cannot fulfill its claim, i.e. proving the Prime matter, as well as solving the problem of changing, that is, the assumption of the Prime matter cannot give a suitable answer to the problem of Continuity and Disconnection. To solve the problem of Continuity and Disconnection, we provided two solutions;
The first solution is based on a three-dimensional analysis and the second solution, which does not require the assumption of the Prime matter, is based on a four-dimensional analysis.
Another argument to prove the Prime matter is Potentiality and Actuality. This argument cannot prove the Prime matter. The claim of the argument is that the proof of the characteristic of the Potentiality comes to the proof of the Prime matter, but
A) The attribution of this characteristic can also be explained in the framework of the Bundel theory, without the need Hylomorphism. The property of being potential, along with the property of being actual, assuming a Bundel theory, are two properties and two constituents of the material object that can be considered as form, so there is no place to prove Prime matter, while it was supposed to be an argument in favor of proving the Prime matter.
b) Also, with modifications in the Bundel theory, the Prime matter will not be proven.
c) Also, by insisting on the many problems of the Bundel theory, it cannot be used in favor of Hylomorphism, because it has some assumptions that are sometimes not accepted by Ibn Sina. One of the assumptions of accepting the objection is to believe in the realism, while according to many evidences, Ibn Sina believes in tropism. So, Potentiality and Actuality argument, under the standard Bundel theory and even its modified versions, cannot prove the Prime matter.
d) The Potentiality and Actuality argument will not work even within the framework of the Substratum This argument under the Substratum theory has more flaws than its proposal under the Bundel theory. Because under this potential, they can neither prove the Prime matter nor can they be the form of the object.
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